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Abstract At present, many countries allow citizens or 
entities to interact with the government outside the telematic 
environment through a legal representative who is granted 
powers of representation. However, if the interaction takes 
place through the Internet, only primitive mechanisms of rep-
resentation are available, and these are mainly based on non-
dynamic offline processes that do not enable quick and easy 
identity delegation. This paper proposes a system of dynamic 
delegation of identity between two generic entities that can 
solve the problem of delegated access to the telematic ser-
vices provided by public authorities. The solution herein is 
based on the generation of a delegation token created from a 
proxy certifícate that allows the delegating entity to delégate 
identity to another on the basis of a subset of its attributes 
as delegator, while also establishing in the delegation token 
itself restrictions on the services accessible to the delegated 
entity and the validity period of delegation. Further, the paper 
presents the mechanisms needed to either revoke a delega-
tion token or to check whether a delegation token has been 
revoked. Implications for theory and practice and suggestions 
for future research are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
In the present phase of development of the information 
society, governments are playing a very important role. In 
many European countries, the public authorities are acting 
as the drivers of this development by implementing a num-
ber of e-government services that enable citizens to engage 
in different administrative processes in a manner that is both 
quick and effective. This development and its promotion by 
the authorities are a consequence of the efforts undertaken by 
the European Union in this field. As the European Commis-
sion sees e-government as a factor of integration and cohe-
sión that can help achieve a single European área, a number 
of directives have been enacted, such as 2004/3 87/CE of 
the European Parliament and Council of 21 April 2004 on 
interoperable delivery of pan-European eGovernment ser-
vices to public administrations, businesses and citizens [1] 
or action plans like the eEurope 2005 Action Plan for the 
delivery of e-government services [2] and the more recent 
Í2010 Action Plan [3], which obligates administrations to 
gradually offer all administrative acts to citizens through the 
Internet. 
As a first step toward the secure use of telematic services 
offered by public institutions, citizens must be provided with 
a digital identity that will identify them to Service Providers 
or other citizens in an unequivocal manner. For this reason, a 
majority of European countries—and others throughout the 
world—are supporting reliable electronic Identity Manage-
ment Systems (eIDM) based mostly on X.509 certificates that 
allow citizens, businesses and government bodies—even in 
different member States—to identify and certify their oper-
ations in a way that is accurate, quick and simple. How-
ever, the solutions adopted to date for the telematic delivery 
of services by the Public Administration are insufficient, 
as they do not enable all possible types of user interaction 
with institutions. Specifically, they do not include an impor-
tant capacity that is offered in many national legal systems: 
namely, identity delegation, through which one citizen can 
authorize another to act on his or her behalf to access cer-
tain services provided by public institutions. Moreover, iden-
tity delegation is one of the main priorities of the European 
Union, as shown in the paper Signposts toward eGovern-
ment 2010 [4], where it is expressly envisaged that one cur-
rent restriction regarding online identity concerns the related 
issues of "delegation", "intermediary", and "roles" manage-
ment. Also, that document states thatby 2010, eID compliant 
systems will support mechanisms to identify and authenticate 
natural persons together with their varying roles (principal, 
delégate, intermediary, authorized agent, etc), including roles 
on behalf of legal persons (administrations or businesses). 
In like manner, the European Commission's eID Roadmap 
[5], according to the report on the state of pan-European 
initiatives for electronic identity management by the EN-
ISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) 
[6] considers it to be a fundamental objective that "citizens 
should be able to designate persons to represent them in 
transactions, and the eIDM solution they use should support 
this". 
Even though identity delegation is a process that is regu-
lated in the legislation of many European countries and it is 
a priority of the European Union that is broadly accepted in 
society, it is not being addressed as a problem and, therefore, 
it is unsupported telematically. That is, where electronic iden-
tity management systems in European e-government envi-
ronments support identity delegation in citizens' telematic 
access to services, they do so in only a rudimentary form. 
This problem has received little attention to date, and no clear 
solution has been found. The main objective of this paper is 
to offer a solution to the problem of identity delegation in 
e-government. Among the features of the proposed delega-
tion system are the following: it is sufflciently secure to be 
used in this environment and it does not require the use of 
offline mechanisms to genérate a delegation and delegation 
can be executed instantaneously without complex steps or the 
participation of a large number of entities. Further, the solu-
tion proposed can be readily integrated in present public key 
infrastructures; thus, given that a large number of European 
Public Administrations base their digital identity systems on 
the use of PKI and X.509 certificates, the solution can be 
implemented in a real environment without major changes 
or behavior modiflcations. 
The following section pro vides the theoretical background 
of the proposal, including a review of the formal concepts of 
identity delegation and its underlying technologies. Section 3 
defines a conceptual model of delegation in the e-government 
environment and the restrictions applicable to this environ-
ment. Section 4 presents the delegation solution and an expla-
nation of its fulfillment of requirements. Section 5 discusses 
the technical viability of the solution and its applicability in 
a real environment. Finally, Sect. 6 presents our conclusions 
and future directions for research. 
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Identity delegation 
The concept of identity delegation is defined by the Modinis 
Study Team in their paper Modinis Study on Identity Man-
agement in eGovernment: Common Terminological Frame-
work for Interoperable Electronic Identity Management [7] 
as "The process in which an identified entity issues a mándate 
to another identified entity." This definition yields the idea 
that the act of delegating consists of one person assigning a 
part of his or her rights to another person, thus allowing the 
latter person to act on behalf of the former person with third 
parties. If we focus on citizens and their interaction with Pub-
lic Administrations, delegation basically involves one citizen 
granting another an authorization or mándate the latter can 
use to access, in the ñame of the former, services provided 
by Public Administrations. 
According to Peeters et al. [8], there are at least three par-
ties involved in the process of delegating electronic identity: 
- Delegator. The person or entity who shares one or more 
privileges in accessing a service with another person or 
entity by means of what is usually called a delegation 
assertion/token. 
- Delegatee: A person who receives the privileges of the 
delegator, namely the delegation assertion, for access to 
a service. 
- Service Provider: An entity that provides services to 
the delegatee following presentation of the delegation 
assertion. 
In addition to these generic entities, and depending on the 
delegation method used, additional entities may appear, 
like Identity Providers or delegation authorities, which are 
responsible for support activities like generating delegation 
assertions or validating the identities of users and entities. 
With this set of basic entities, [9] presents a classification 
of delegation in two different models: 
- Direct delegation model: The delegator delegates a sub-
set of privileges to the delegatee, who uses them to access 
a service (see Fig. 1). 
- Indirect delegation model: This is the same as the direct 
delegation model, but it is executed through a set of inter-
medíate delegates. That is, the delegatee in turn delegates 
to a third party, thus yielding an indeterminate number 
of delegation leaps (see Fig. 2). 
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Any delegation process must take into consideration three 
important points. 
The flrst is that delegation does not imply authorization. 
That is, even if delegation is accepted, the Service Provider is 
not obligated to allow the privileges requested by the delega-
tee, and the delegatee may not possess the privileges required 
for that service. The Service Provider shall always retain the 
decision-making power to accept or deny the request made 
by the delegatee. 
Second, the delegation assertion must always demónstrate 
the consent to the delegation on the part of the delegator, as 
the latter may set further conditions on the act of delegation. 
For example, the delegator may establish a validity period 
for the delegation by deflning a time frame or restrict the 
capacity for indirect delegation and, if indirect delegation is 
allowed, specify a limit. 
Finally, the process must always seek to preserve the pri-
vacy of the delegator by not allowing the delegatee to disclose 
more information on the delegator than that authorized by the 
delegator in the delegation assertion or in the prevailing del-
egation policy. 
delegation is truly meant to be dynamic, the process of gener-
ating a delegation token must be as immediate and indepen-
dent as possible: it must minimize the cost in both processing 
capacity and necessary equipment as much as possible. 
Second, the delegation token must be sufflciently secure. 
That is, a Service Provider receiving it must be able to unmis-
takably discern whether the delegation process has been exe-
cuted correctly or not and retain the capacity to determine 
whether the token presented by a delegatee is correct, whether 
it has been altered since it was generated, and whether it was 
truly generated by the entity identifled as the delegator. 
If the objective is to enable dynamic and secure delegation 
and delégate access to services in a way that can determine, 
based on the identity attributes of the delegator, whether the 
delegator is granted access to the service or not, we will flnd 
that the token itself must carry any delegator attributes nec-
essary, either directly or by means of a reference to them 
that will allow the Service Provider to retrieve them or query 
them. 
The delegation token must be a self-contained information 
item that fulfllls the following set of requirements: 
2.2 Delegation token requirements 
One of the key elements in any identity delegation system 
is what is called a delegation token, an item that allows an 
entity to show that it has authorization to act on behalf of 
another. There are múltiple alternatives in handling identity 
information (SAML, X.509 certificates, etc.), each with its 
own advantages and drawbacks. However, the fleld of options 
narrows when the point is to propose a system that will enable 
dynamic identity delegation and support the establishment of 
restrictions in delegated access to services based on user attri-
butes, that is, based on the identity attributes of the delegator. 
Dynamic identity delegation entails a series of require-
ments that must be fulfilled for a solution to be valid. 
First, users who wish to delégate must be capable of gen-
erating either on their own, or with minimal involvement 
of fhird parties, a token that enables delegation. Further, if 
1. Quick and easy generation, with minimal involvement 
of third parties. 
2. Integrity. It must be possible to detect whether or not the 
token has been altered since it was generated. 
3. Generator identiflcation. The token must enable iden-
tiflcation of the person who generated it: that is, the 
delegator. 
4. User identiflcation. The token must allow for determin-
ing whether the entity using it is the same for which it 
was generated, that is, the delegatee. 
5. Retrieval of identity attributes. The token must enable 
retrieval of identity information required to access the 
service. 
6. Service identiflcation. The token must contain clear 
information on the services offered by the Service Pro-
vider for which delegation is enabled. 
2.3 Review of literature on delegation 
Traditionally, delegation has been studied in an environment 
called RBAC, Role Based Access Control [10]. In the RBAC 
model, assignment of permissions to users is not direct, but 
instead uses roles. That is, permissions are assigned to roles 
and users are assigned certain roles according to the tasks they 
are to perform, and users automatically acquire permissions 
associated with said roles. The separation between users, 
roles, and permissions allows for management of access con-
trol by systems administrators. 
Even though a study that can be considered in-depth has 
been made on delegation in RBAC systems, with proposals 
such as RDM200 by Zang et al. [11], the ideas and solutions 
they propose are not applicable to the fleld of work we are 
addressing herein. The fundamental reason for this lies in the 
fact that the mechanism for managing users' identities and 
the environment for applying solutions are utterly different 
in both theoretical and practical terms. 
In RBAC environments, users are assigned a limited set of 
roles, and services are provided to users with a determínate 
role. The service provisión environment of public authorities 
must be more flexible and granular. The main reason is that 
services are to be provided to users who possess certain attri-
butes. However, as a single user may have a large number 
of attributes, the set of combinations used as the basis for 
establishing restrictions for access to a service would also 
be quite large, giving rise to an unmanageable number of 
roles. In addition, although this paper discusses a speciflc 
environment that may appear closed, the solution aims to 
be flexible, intended for possible application in the future to 
broader, more global environments, as we shall see below. 
With respect to delegation between persons based on user 
attributes and on generation of a delegation item that can 
grant a user or entity access to a service on behalf of another 
user or entity, we will flnd that no globally accepted solutions 
exist, let alone implementations of such solutions. 
Even though this is an oíd problem in telematic security, 
the issue of identity delegation as it is posed in this paper 
has not been broadly studied until relatively recently. None-
theless, academic literature offers a number of delegation 
systems conceived for different purposes and using different 
technologies. The following examples are notable because 
of fheir proximity to the objectives of this paper. 
X.509 Proxy Certificates for Dynamic Delegation [12]. 
One of the flrst studies on identity delegation dates from 
2004, by Von Welch and other authors. Even though it is not 
focused on identity delegation in identity management sys-
tems, an interesting solution for delegation is presented for a 
completely different environment, namely Grid networks. 
A Delegation Framework for Federated Identity 
Management [13]. This delegation system was presented 
by Gomi et al. and it proposes a delegation framework for 
Web Services and federated identity management systems 
based on an RBAC mechanism. 
Cross-Context Delegation through Identity Federation 
[8]. Proposal for delegation system by Roel Peeters et al. 
The authors describe a basic delegation scheme in a feder-
ated environment that is quite similar to the preceding one, 
but which is more generic and user-oriented. Delegation is 
achieved through a token that presents certain similarities to 
attribute certificates deflned in RFC 3281 [14]. 
A Delegation Framework for Liberty [9]. In 2008, 
Alrodhan et al. presented a delegation framework for the 
Liberty technology. This proposal integrates perfectly in the 
proposals by Liberty [15] in identity federation. The frame-
work described in the article uses the advantages provided 
by the relations of trust that exist by definition in the circles 
of trust as conceived by Liberty and is based on the extensión 
of the attribute statements in SAML assertions. 
Proposal of Delegation Using Electronic Certificates 
on Single Sign-On System with SAML-Protocol [16]. A 
recent proposal by Komura et al. presents a system of delega-
tion for web applications in a scenario that assumes that the 
applications are accessible in a single sign-on system based 
on SAML speciflcations, where users are authenticated and 
authorized by the Identity Provider with X.509 certificates 
stored on individual smart cards. 
A fundamental aspect of the identity delegation solution 
proposed in the present paper is its orientation toward iden-
tity delegation between persons in a dynamic and secure 
manner for telematic access to services. One of the miss-
ing ingredients in most solutions proposed is precisely such 
an orientation toward this type of delegation, as they have 
been conceived mainly for processes of delegation between 
machines or services. Another key aspect of our proposal 
lies in delegation and delegated access to services on the 
basis of a subset of delegator attributes, with the use of a 
delegation token that must be self-contained and secure. As 
discussed previously, if the need for dynamism and security 
in identity delegation is combined with the need to establish 
restrictions in delegated access to services based on the iden-
tity attributes of the delegator, a number of requirements for 
the delegation token arise. These requirements, considered 
essential by the authors, are presented at the end of Sect. 2.2. 
Although the majority of papers analyzed fulflll one or more 
of these requirements, none cover all of fhem, unlike the 
solution presented herein. 
2.4 Outline of underlying technologies 
Taking into consideration the foregoing, this paper presents a 
solution for the delegation token that has not been previously 
suggested for the delegation of identity between persons and 
is, henee, entirely novel in this fleld. It is based on a com-
bination of the two technologies: X.509 proxy certificates 
[17] and SAML 2.0 language (Security Assertion Markup 
Language) [18]. Our summary explanation for these choices 
is as follows: 
- Proxy certifícates: owing mainly to their easy integra-
tion in most identity systems presently being used in 
European countries—most use X.509 certifícates1 to 
authenticate users. Also by their potential for dynamic 
generation without the involvement of third parties, their 
ability to quickly and easily identify the generating entity 
and the entity for which it was generated. Finally, because 
they are fully veriflable from the point of view of integ-
rity. 
- SAML for the transport of user attributes, specifically 
SAML assertions with attribute statements: it is a rela-
tively simple method for retrieving user attributes and 
because it is now the dominant trend in both the stan-
dardization and use of electronic identity management 
systems or eIDMs. 
The use and combining of these technologies beneflts from 
the advantages of both. First, proxy certifícates, in addition to 
their ease of integration in PKI-based environments, offer the 
well-known advantages of X.509 public key certifícates. For 
their part, SAML assertions lend the solution flexibility by 
allowing for a simple exchange of identity attributes between 
different security domains. Although the solution proposed 
is focused on a closed environment, we have sought to leave 
it as open as possible for future application in more complex 
environments. 
The following section provides a brief summary of each 
of the technologies and the result of their combined use. 
2.4.1 Proxy certifícates 
X.509 proxy certifícates are deflned in RFC 3820 [17], 
having emerged as a result of different needs that are not suf-
ficiently met by X.509 certifícates [19], the clearest case per-
haps being dynamic delegation, that is, the granting of a set of 
privileges by one entity to another for ahighly speciflc period 
of time. It is true that such delegations could be achieved with 
other elements from the X.509 world. For example, X.509 
attribute certifícates [14] can be used to delégate certain rights 
to other holders of X.509 certifícates. However, the genera-
tion of attribute certifícates implies the involvement of new 
entities such as attribute authorities and a large amount of 
processing and, henee, a large amount of time, making the 
process unsuitable for generating delegation in a dynamic 
1
 Throughout this paper "X.509 certifícate" refers to X.509 public key 
certifícates that demónstrate user identity according to RFC 5280 [20], 
"X.509 proxy certifícate" refers to certifícates defined in RFC 3820 [17] 
and "X.509 public key certifícate" includes both of them. 
manner. These processing and time costs could be accepted in 
environments that do not require dynamism in delegation, but 
this is not the case herein. Another problem with using attri-
bute certifícates relates to interoperability: more specifically, 
the need to adapt pre-existing environments for their use. As 
we will see, the use of proxy certifícates does not imply 
the modifleation of the protocols or systems of authentica-
tion and authorization that make use of certifícates, because 
they are common X.509 certifícates with certain extensions. 
This supposes that the interchange and handling of this type 
of certifícates imply minimum modifleations in the present 
applications. X.509 certifícates and proxy certifícates have 
the same format, as both link a public key to a subject ñame, 
allowing proxy certifícates to be used easily and without new 
implementations involving librarles and protocols initially 
prepared to work with X.509 certifícates. 
The main difference between X.509 certifícates and proxy 
certifícates lies in how they are generated. Unlike X.509 cer-
tifícates, the entity that generates a proxy certifícate is not a 
certifleation authority (CA), but rather an entity identifled 
by an X.509 certifícate or another proxy certifícate. This 
immensely simplifles the process of generating certifícates, 
as it dispenses with the process of interacting with certiflea-
tion authorities. Without this interaction, management time 
is shorter and dynamic, as intended by the solution herein. 
One notable feature of proxy certifícates is the fact that 
their public key is different than the public key of the entity 
generating the certifícate, and they may even have different 
properties. For example, an entity may have a X.509 certif-
ícate that uses a 1024-bit RSA key but genérate proxy cer-
tifícates with 2048-bit RSA keys. A proxy certifícate is an 
X.509 certifícate with the following properties: 
1. It can be signed by the end entity of an X.509 certifícate 
and by an entity possessing another proxy certifícate. 
2. It can be used only to sign other proxy certifícates, but 
never X.509 certifícates for end entities. 
3. It has its own public-private key pair. 
4. The identity present in the proxy certifícate derives from 
the identity of the X.509 certifícate of the entity that 
signed it. When the proxy certifícate is used for authen-
tication, it inherits the rights of the X.509 certifícate 
that signed it, yet subject to the restrictions specifled in 
the proxy certifícate by means of mechanisms discussed 
below. 
5. The identity of the proxy certifícate derives from the 
identity of the X.509 certifícate used to genérate it and 
is unique at the generator level. 
6. Proxy certifícates contain an extensión that identify 
them as such and allow for establishing usage policies. 
This extensión, along with other flelds and X.509 exten-
sions, allows for it to be properly validated. 
¡d-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(l) ¡dent¡fied-organization(3) 
dod(6) ¡nternet(l) secur¡ty(5) mechan¡sms(5) pkix(7)} 
id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {¡d-pkix 1} 
id-pe-proxyCertlnfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 14 } 
ProxyCertlnfo ::= SEQUENCE { 
pCPathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL, 
proxyPolicy ProxyPolicy} 
ProxyPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { 
policyLanguage OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
policy OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } 
Fig. 3 ASN.l definition of the PCI extensión (Proxy Certifícate 
Information extensión) 
2.4.1.1 Proxy Certificate Information extensión X.509 cer-
tificates and proxy certificates have the same format but, in 
accordance with RFC 3820, all proxy certificates must con-
tain a critical extensión called Proxy Certifícate Informa-
tion extensión (PCI), whose ASN.l definition is shown in 
Fig. 3. This extensión has different objectives or function-
alities. First, it serves to identify the certifícate as a proxy 
certifícate. Second, it enables the certifícate generator to 
express its desires with regard to the delegation of rights and 
to limit the number of proxy certificates that can be generated 
from it. 
To support the preferences of the generating entity with 
respect to the delegation, the PCI extensión has a framework 
for transporting the delegation policies expressed in any pol-
icy language, with the solé restriction being that both parties 
must be able to interpret said language and, therefore, the pol-
icy defined. To achieve this, the p r o x y P o l i c y field in the 
PCI extensión is used. As we can see in the ASN. 1 definition, 
the p r o x y P o l i c y field consists, in turn, of another two 
fields: p o l i c y L a n g u a g e and the p o l i c y . The p o l i -
cyLanguage field indicates the language in which the pol-
icy is expressed and po 1 i cy is an optional field that contains 
a statement of the policy in the language indicated by the 
former. RFC 3820 on proxy certificates defines two val-
úes for the p o l i c y L a n g u a g e field that are of par-
ticular importance, as they must be understood by all 
implementations of proxy certificates: i d - p p l - i n h e r -
i t A l l (Proxying) and i d - p p l - i n d e p e n d e n t 
(Independent). 
The valué of i d - p p l - i n h e r i t A l l (Proxying) indi-
cates that the generator of the proxy certifícate delegates all 
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privileges to the holder of the proxy certifícate. The valué of 
i d - p p l - i n d e p e n d e n t (Independent) indicates the con-
trary: that is, the generator assigns no privileges to the proxy 
certifícate, meaning that the proxy certifícate can only pro-
vide its holder a unique identifier that can be used along with 
other solutions to grant privileges. 
In these two cases, the p o l i c y field must be empty, as 
the delegation policy is implicit. 
When other valúes are used for the p o l i c y L a n g u a g e 
field, the policy field will contain the policy that establishes 
the use restrictions of the proxy certifícate, except in cases in 
which the policy is implicit in the valué itself, as in the two 
preceding cases. 
To limit the number of proxy certificates that can be gen-
erated from one proxy certifícate, the pCPathLenCon-
s t r a i n t field is used. This field uses an integer to establish 
a restriction on the máximum length of the proxy certifica-
tion path that can be generated from the proxy certifícate. If 
the valué of p C P a t h L e n C o n s t r a i n t is zero, this indi-
cates that the proxy certifícate cannot be used to genérate 
other proxy certificates. If the valué is n, where n is an inte-
ger within the permitted range, this indicates that the proxy 
certifícate can be used to genérate n proxy certificates under 
it: that is, in which the initial proxy certifícate is the root (see 
Fig. 4). It should be recalled that this field may not be shown, 
in which case it is considered an infinite valué. 
2.4.1.2 Process of generating a proxy certifícate for delega-
tion The process of generating proxy certificates as part of 
the delegation between a delegator and a delegatee implies 
communication between them through a secure channel and 
the series of steps shown below (Fig. 5): 
1. The delegatee generates a key pair, one public and the 
other private, and forms a request for a proxy certifícate. 
2. The delegatee sends the request generated through an 
authenticated channel with an integrity guarantee. 
3. The delegator checks whether the request is correct, and 
if it is, it generates proxy certifícate. The certifícate will 
be signed with either the private key of the delegator or 
the private key of another proxy certifícate. 
4. The delegator sends the delegatee the proxy certifí-
cate generated through an authenticated channel with 
an integrity guarantee. 
Allowgenerationof Allow gene ratio n of 
Proxy \ Proxy \ f Proxy 
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Fig. 5 X.509 proxy certifícate generation process for delegation 
The process of generating proxy certificates is much quicker 
and easier than for X.509 certificates; its main advantage 
being that it does not require the intervention of a CA. 
2.4.1.3 Validating and revoking proxy certificates RFC 
5280 [20] defines the idea of validating the certification path 
as a process of finding a trusted path from an end entity's 
X.509 certifícate to the root certifícate of a certification 
authority. In a manner similar, proxy certificates, verification 
of the certification path of a specific proxy certifícate consists 
of finding a trusted path through a chain of proxy certificates 
to the X.509 certifícate of the entity that generated the flrst 
proxy certifícate in the chain. 
Below is a possible verification algorithm of the certifica-
tion path as detailed in RFC 3820. It is important to recall 
that the process of validating proxy certificates presented 
involves validating the time and date upon validation, but it 
would be possible to envisage validation of a proxy certifícate 
for a specific moment in the past, given that no mechanisms 
exist to validate a proxy certifícate for a moment outside its 
validity period. 
A valid certification path always begins in a X.509 certifí-
cate for an end entity or end entity certifícate (EEC) correctly 
validated according to the procedures indicated in RFC 5280 
[20]. Validation of a proxy certifícate requires a distinguished 
ñame and the public key of the EEC that generated it, and 
the certification path, that is, a chain of n certificates, must 
fulfill the following conditions: 
1. For any x in the set between 1 and n - 1 , the valué of the 
subject field of the x certifícate must match the valué of 
the issuer field of the proxy certifícate where x + 1 is a 
legal distinguished ñame subject because it was gener-
ated by certifícate x. 
2. Certifícate 1 is a valid proxy certifícate generated by the 
end entity certifícate (EEC) provided as an input to the 
process of validating the proxy certification path. 
3. The certifícate n is not the proxy certifícate to be vali-
dated. 
4. For any x in the range between 1 and n, the certifícate 
was valid at the time in question. 
5. For certificates in the path with a pCPathLenCon-
s t r a i n t field, the number of certificates following it 
in the certification path does not exceed the length spec-
ified in said field. 
One aspect that is notable for its importance in the certif-
ícate environment and, particularly when used in identity 
delegation, is revocation. As the RFC on proxy certificates 
[17] does not define a mechanism for revocation, no method 
is presently implemented for the revocation of these certif-
icates. Traditionally, proxy certificates used for delegation 
have been used in environments where delegation periods 
are quite short, so proxy certificates' lifetimes are very short. 
This sharply limits the danger that a proxy certifícate might 
be compromised and misused and, thus, reduces the pressure 
to find a solution to this problem. However, in delegation 
of identity between citizens for access to services provided 
by Public Administrations, delegation periods can be long, 
and the risk that a certifícate may be compromised is very 
high. Henee, given that proxy certificates can be identified 
uniquely if we associate fhem with their generator (the issuer-
serial number binomial is unique), a mechanism will later be 
defined for revoking and checking the revocation status of 
a proxy certifícate with the use of mechanisms similar to 
CRLs (Certifícate Revocation Lists) [20] or OCSP (Online 
Certifícate Status Protocol) [21] used in the X.509 certifi-
cates. 
2.4.2 SAML 
This section will provide abrief introduction to the SAML 2.0 
protocol [22,23]. This is a standard that has been developed 
and maintained by the Security Services Technical Commit-
tee [24] of the Organization for the Advancement of Struc-
tured Information Standards (OASIS) [25]. In summary, it 
can be said that the SAML defines an XML-based platform 
for the description or exchange of security information; that 
is, authentication and authorization information exchanged 
by different security domains over the Internet. For such an 
exchange to oceur, the information is packaged in messages 
of a pre-established structure called assertions (SAML Asser-
tions). The standard defines a precise syntax and a set of rules 
for creating, requesting, communicating and using SAML 
assertions: that is, it defines what data is to be exchanged 
and how that data is structured in messages, while offering a 
standard single sign-on solution. 
2.4.2.1 SAML Assertions Assertions are SAML compo-
nents that contain statements about an entity, with a structure 
and content defined as an XML scheme of SAML assertions. 
Assertions with attribute statements are of particular interest 
for us, as they enable creation of a delegation token along 
with a proxy certifícate. 
As we have seen, and in accordance with [18], we might 
say that SAML allows an entity to assert, through assertions, 
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3.1 Participating entities 
Generically, we might say that four entities or agents are 
involved in a scenario of identity federation:2 
- User (U): A person who seeks to access the services 
offered by a provider and whose identity is federated. It 
is assumed that the user has some form of credential that 
is accepted by the Identity Provider and, optionally, by 
the Service Provider. 
- User Agent (UA): An agent employed by the user to 
communicate or interact with the Service Provider and 
the Identity Provider. 
- Service Provider (SP): Offers a service to the user. Before 
access is allowed to the service, the user must be authen-
ticated. If the Service Provider accepts theuser's original 
credentials, it may carry out the authentication directly; 
otherwise, authentication is delegated to an Identity Pro-
vider that does possess this capacity and, further, is an 
entity trusted by the Service Provider. 
- Identity Provider (IdP): The entity responsible for vali-
dating the user's credentials and delivering session cre-
dentials that can be validated by the Service Provider 
when authenticating a user prior to providing a service. 
3.2 Interaction for service access and delivery 
Figure 8 shows the interactions for access to a service by a 
user according to the generic model and their order. Then, 
each interaction is described in detail. 
1. Through the UA, the user requests from delivery of a 
service from the SP. 
2. The SP answers the service request by indicating to the 
UA what authentication protocols it supports and what 
IdPs it trusts. 
3. The UA establishes communication with an IdP and 
presents the user's credentials with a view to achiev-
ing authentication and obtaining a session credential 
that will be valid for accessing the service provided by 
the SP. 
4. The IdP authenticates the user based on the credentials 
and, if everything is in order, issues a session credential. 
5. The IdP sends the session credential to the UA. 
6. The UA sends the session credential to the SP. 
7. The SP validates the credential received from the UA 
and verifles the user's access rights. 
8. If everything is in order, the SP delivers the service 
requested to the user. 
2
 This generic model of identity management does not include PKI 
because it does not participate in the token generation process. Never-
theless, as explained below, it plays a key role in validating signatures, 
certificates and so on. 
Further, the above process may have a series of steps in which 
the user selects a digital identity. In this case, the user, the 
user agent, and the Service Provider interact for the purpose 
of selecting the identity to be used and, henee, the Identity 
Provider to be contacted in step 3. It should be recalled that 
the interactions depicted herein reflect a high-level, generic 
model that does not address the capabilities or mechanisms 
necessary to carry them out. Henee, for example, no indica-
tion is given of the method for redirections, which may be 
executed similarly to Single Sign-On redirection proflles in 
SAML. 
3.3 Applicable domain and restrictions 
Before presenting the proposed delegation solution, it would 
be useful to clearly define what domain is applicable to the 
different solutions and what set of restrictions is to be applied 
in accordance with the specific conditions of the domain. 
The scenario for application in which work has been con-
ducted and for which the solution has been conceived is Pub-
lic Administration, with delivery of services to citizens in 
environments involving use of identity management systems 
with a model that is similar to that presented previously. 
Three basic entities are involved in these scenarios: the 
user, the Identity Provider (IdP), and the Service Provider 
(SP). If we analyze these entities in the environment of Pub-
lic Administrations, we will find that, unlike the generic 
model, both the Identity Provider and the Service Provider 
are controlled by the same organization, namely the state, 
which implies a series of aspeets that should be considered 
in assessing the solution. Because it is a "closed" environ-
ment in which only the Public Administration acts as the 
Service Provider and Identity Provider, it can be assumed 
that relations of trust exist between the different IdPs and 
SPs that might particípate in a transaction between citizens 
and Public Administration: that is, we can presume that all 
entities in the Public Administration involved in a transaction 
are trusted third parties (TTPs) to each other. In spite of the 
closed nature of the environment, the Public Administration 
itself contains múltiple configurations with múltiple security 
domains, even in a single country. Therefore, the solution 
proposed addresses this problem and strives to be flexible in 
order to adapt to possible existing configurations. 
One may pre-suppose that the behavior of entities will be 
proper, in the sense that their treatment of information on cit-
izens is correct and as expected according to their status and 
functionality, as they are considered to be properly audited 
and monitored. Moreover, they are, by definition, reliable 
sources of information, especially the IdPs, which have the 
basic role of authenticating citizens and providing reliable 
information on their identity. 
Another of the assumptions one can make is that mecha-
nisms will exist so that citizens need not concern themselves 
about issues such as usurpation in either the IdP or the SP: 
that is, it is assumed that both Identity Providers and Service 
Providers reside in environments that are free of problems 
such as phishing. Finally, it is assumed that citizens partici-
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Fig. 9 Proposed application scenario 
pating in the transactions will use an electronic identity based 
on X.509 certificates and on an associated PKI (Public Key 
Infraestructure) that is similar to that implemented today in 
many member States of the European Union. Figure 9 con-
tains a graphic depiction of the proposed application sce-
nario. All entities in the Public Administration would have 
a relationship of trust between them and shall be auditable: 
they can be checked at any time to ensure that their behavior 
is as expected. Moreover, the Identity Provider constitutes a 
reliable source of data. That is, fhere are guarantees that the 
information provided is authentic and valid at the moment 
of the query. Users access the Identity Provider and the Ser-
vice Provider through secure and authenticated connections 
to ensure that exchanges of information oceur between the 
right entities. Both users and entities in the Public Admin-
istration have X.509 certificates to attest to their electronic 
identity. They also have a set of capacities necessary for inter-
acting with a PKI to engage in all processes associated with 
the query, revocation, and validation of X.509 certificates. 
4 Delegation solution 
4.1 Working methodology 
The methodology used in undertaking the work presented 
herein is based on the successive approximations to a 
solutions that fulfllls the requirements of the application envi-
ronment, as set forth in Sect. 2.2. Henee, as we shall see, a 
combination of the two basic technologies discussed above 
is the starting point: proxy certificates that enable delegation 
and their integration with SAML attribute assertions for the 
correct identiflcation and transfer of attributes in the process. 
Additional elements are added, depending on the speciflc 
needs of the application environment. 
4.2 Preliminary notes 
As mentioned, the integration of SAML assertions in X.509 
certificates as proposed in the GridShib constitutes the basis 
of the identity delegation token proposed in this paper, and it 
will be used in an environment of identity delegation between 
citizens or entities for interaction with Service Providers in 
Public Administrations. This application environment poses 
a series of requirements that prevents the system presented 
in the Gridshib project from being directly applicable, as we 
will see. Nonetheless, it is valid as an initial basis for devel-
opment and this is how it has been used. 
The flrst problem of the token as presented is that it is con-
ceived for use in Grid environments: that is, for delegation 
of identity between processes with very speciflc and clearly 
deflned tasks and which, henee, need not be specifled in the 
delegation token because they are known a priori. The func-
tionality of the process receiving the delegation is limited 
by the code itself. For example, as an FTP process can per-
form only those tasks for which it has been encoded from 
among the tasks specifled in the FTP standard, the limitation 
is established a priori. 
Delegation of identity in Public Administration environ-
ments as addressed in this paper involves delegation between 
citizens or between entities and citizens. That is, it is del-
egation between natural persons or between legal persons 
and natural persons, and this entails a series of conditions 
that must be taken into account. First, delegation between 
processes in a Grid environment usually has a quite lim-
ited duration—typically minutes or a few hours—with a 
few highly speciflc tasks. This explains why the solution 
adopted by Gridshib project does not include the possibil-
ity of revoking the delegation, namely the delegation token. 
This would not be viable in the environment herein. Dele-
gation oceurs between persons and for periods of time that 
can range from a few hours to several days or years. In peri-
ods this long, with the involvement of persons, countless 
situations may arise that might require revocation of a dele-
gation. A solution based on such short delegation periods is 
not valid in such environments because it would lead to con-
tinuous revocation of delegation for each interaction, with 
the resulting drawbacks for users. Due to poor planning, a 
delegation token might expire before the end of the interac-
tion with which it is associated. This is an obvious problem 
and, henee, a system of delegation is needed that supports 
revocation. 
Finally, the solution proposed by GridShib involves use 
of SAML vl. l . This versión is now obsolete, having been 
updated to SAML 2.0. The delegation token proposed herein 
uses the latest versión. Therefore, from this point onwards, 
unless otherwise specifled, all references to SAML in this 
paper can be understood as corresponding to SAML 2.0. 
4.3 Problems found and our contributions 
4.3.1 Services identiflcation 
One of the key aspeets in access to online services, whether 
these are provided by the Public Administrations or prí-
vate companies, is the correct identiflcation of said services. 
While múltiple solutions exist for univocally identifying 
online objeets and services, the most widespread of these 
is the one specifled in RFC 3986 [28], which defines URIs 
(Uniform Resource Identiflers). The W3C (World Wide Web 
Consortium) specifles in its recommendation on addressing 
ofthese services, called Web Services Addressing 1.0—Core 
[29], that the element for univocally identifying a service 
is the IRI (Internationalized Resource Identifler). IRIs are 
deflned in RFC 3987 [30], where it is clearly specifled that 
they are a complement to URIs. An IRI is a sequence of 
characters from a universal character set called Unicode/ISO 
10646 that can univocally identify an object or resource on 
the Internet, thus avoiding certain limitations in URIs with 
regard to the characters that can be used and making it more 
international than URL Nonetheless, IRIs are designed to 
be compatible with URIs. Even though they are more main-
stream, use of IRIs is not as widespread as URIs, mainly 
because certain commonly-used protocols, like HTTP, do 
not support the use of IRIs, though they do support URIs. 
In view of the foregoing and, although it is not in widespread 
use, we propose to use IRIs as the mechanism for identifying 
services in the identity delegation token. The reasons for this 
choice are as follows: 
- The mechanism deflned should be as standard as possi-
ble, and IRIs are deflned by the W3C in their recommen-
dation on addressing of web services [29]. 
- IRIs are an extensión of URIs and, henee, the definitions 
for IRIS are applicable to URIs, providing coverage to 
those used at present. 
- The mechanism deflned should be as flexible as possible 
and IRIs encompass a much wider addressing range than 
URIs. 
IRIs correspond to a chain of characters that can univocally 
identify a resource. They also have a hirerarchical structure 
that provides a clear idea of the logical location of a service 
on a provider. Service providers generally make a logical 
grouping of services according to different criteria that usu-
ally yields a hierarchical distribution in the form of a tree, 
resulting in a structure similar to that shown in Fig. 10. 
Fig. 10 Possible hierarchical structure of provider services 
4.3.2 Restricted token use in the services tree 
In delegation of identity, one important aspect of accessing a 
provider's services is the capability to clearly and concisely 
identify service(s) to which access is delegated. As we have 
seen, this is solved with the use of IRIs.3 
A task that is not as simple, and for which no solution 
exists to date, is specification in a delegation of not only one 
service but a specific set of services throughout the logical 
distribution of the provider's services. The ultímate goal is 
to make use of IRIs' hierarchical structure to enable the del-
egator to specify in the identity delegation token itself which 
services will be subject to delegation and which will not: that 
is, to establish a logical pruning of the service tree offered 
by the provider. Generically, any one of the following three 
cases is possible: 
a Delegation applies to only one of the services offered by 
the provider. For example, the one identitíed by the IRI 
http://eadministration.org/IncomeTax/Charity in Fig. 10. 
3
 A priori, the services offered by public administrations do not require 
different permissions according to types of citizens, but rather enable 
all citizens to carry out a limited a specific set of operations. If a citizen 
decides to delégate access to a service, the delegatee will have the same 
privileges as the delegator. Henee, this paper does not seek to define 
with greater granularity the privileges or permissions of delegatees in 
access to services. Nevertheless, the authors believe that this possibility 
could be of interest in lending the system greater flexibility and it will 
be included in future work. 
b Delegation applies to a set of services dependent on the 
same logical root of a provider: that is, a branch of the log-
ical tree. For example, the branch identitíed by IRI http:// 
eadministration.org/IncomeTax/ in Fig. 10. 
c Delegation applies to a set of limited subset out of 
the total services offered by the provider. For example, 
those identitíed by the IRIs http://eadministration.org/ 
VAT and all those under the one identitíed by http:// 
eadministration.org/IncomeTax, except for employment, 
which is identitíed by IRI http://eadministration.org/ 
IncomeTax/Employment in Fig. 10. 
A solution to this problem requires the capacity to add to the 
delegation token a mechanism that can clearly and optimally 
define which services can be accessed by the delégate and 
which cannot. At tírst glance, it would seem that the prob-
lem is not quite so serious, as it is generally assumed that 
the solution consists of including in the delegation token a 
list of all the service IRIs to which access is granted. This 
solution is both simple and valid, but it is limited to a simple 
operating environment in which the number of services per 
provider is relatively small; otherwise, the service list and, 
henee, the delegation token, could become unmanageable. 
Given that the identity delegation token proposed herein is 
composed of a proxy certifícate with a set of non-critical 
extensions, the solution must be capable of fully integrat-
ing into it. This is why we have decided to define a new non-
critical extensión called servicelRIConstraints to be included 
in the delegation token, with the capacity to optimally specify 
the set of services within the logical structure of a provider 
to which delegated access is granted. 
An extensión of the X.509 v3 certifícate consists of a 
unique OÍD, a Boolean valué that indicates whether or not 
it is critical and a chain of octets corresponding to the DER 
encoding of the extensión valué. Obviously, because this is a 
proposal, we cannot now specify a unique OÍD for the exten-
sión. The proposed extensión is not critical, as it is designed 
to be used in delegation environments along with proxy cer-
tificates that are designed to be easy to use, with no new 
implementations or with minimal updates by librarles and 
protocols initially prepared to work only with X.509 certifi-
cates. If the extensión were critical, we would be forcing all 
librarles and protocols to be able to interpret and manage it 
and, therefore, the identity delegation token would not be as 
flexible as it is meant to be. 
Clearly, in an environment where delegation is based on 
the model proposed in this paper, with use of the identity dele-
gation token as described, all entities that have to deal with the 
token must be able to understand and manage the extensión 
servicelRIConstraints. Figure 11 presents the ASN. 1 definí -
tion of the extensión. Provisionally, and pending study and 
approval by the standards authorities and assignment of an 
oftícial OÍD, it has been assigned the object ID 99. Basically, 
id-ce-serviceIRIConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER : := { id-ce 99 } 
serviceIRIConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { 
permittedSubtrees [0] ServiceSubtrees OPTIONAL, 
excludedSubtrees [1] ServiceSubtrees OPTIONAL } 
ServiceSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ServiceSubtree 
ServiceSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { 
base internationalizedResourceldentifier, 
mínimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, 
máximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } 
internationalizedResourceldentifier ::= UniversalString 
BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) 
Fig. 11 ASN.l definition ofproposed non-critical extensión service-
IRIConstraints 
the extensión allows for establishing limitations in the dele-
gated access to services: that is, it can specify which services 
can be used with the identity delegation token and which can-
not. It indicates these services through its IRI, defining two 
lists: the permitted IRIs and the excluded IRIs, and it permits 
logical grouping through root nodes. We shall now discuss 
in detail the extensión's fields and their possible valúes. 
As shown in Fig. 11, the proposed extensión consists of 
two fields, p e r m i t t e d S u b t r e e s and e x c l u d e d S u b -
t r e e s , both of which are optional. The former of these 
specifies the IRI(s) of the services for which the delegator 
allows the delegatee to use the delegation token in which 
the extensión is embedded. The latter indicates the opposite, 
namely the IRI(s) for which the delegator does not allow the 
delegatee to access and use the delegation token in which the 
extensión is embedded. In both cases, the data type is S e r -
v i c e S u b t r e e s , which, as seen in Fig. 11, is defined as a 
sequence of S e r v i c e S u b t r e e elements in which at least 
one element and a máximum of MAX elements must appear. 
S e r v i c e S u b t r e e is in turn composed of a sequence of 
three elements: ba se , minimum, and máximum. The first 
two are mandatory, and the third is optional. Element b a s e 
is defined as an element of the same type as that used in 
defining IRIs under RFC 3987, so it may contain any IRI. 
The fields minimum and máximum are of type B a s e -
D i s t a n c e , that is, are elements defined as an integer 
between 0 and MAX. By default, field minimum, which is 
mandatory, takes the valué zero, while máximum is optional. 
The field is defined in exactly the same way as the previous 
one but it is optional: that is, it need not appear and therefore 
has no default valué. 
As seen from the definition of its components, a S e r -
v i c e S u b t r e e element can define the base IRI of a Service 
Provider and, using that base, the minimum and máximum 
logical depth at which services can be found when permitting 
or excluding their use by the delegatee. That is, each S e r -
v i c e S u b t r e e element can clearly define a service or set of 
services within a provider's logical organization of services. 
We have noted that the extensión is composed of two 
elements: p e r m i t t e d S u b t r e e s and e x c l u d e d S u b -
t r e e s . 
Both are S e r v i c e S u b t r e e s and, henee, are sequences 
of elements that concisely define a service or set of services 
within a provider. 
The element p e r m i t t e d S u b t r e e s is used to spec-
ify the services to which the delegatee can access with the 
identity delegation token. On the other hand, the e x c l u d -
e d S u b t r e e s element is used to specify the services, on 
a given Service Provider, to which access with the identity 
delegation token by the delegatee is specifically denied. The 
combination of p e r m i t t e d S u b t r e e s and e x c l u d e d -
S u b t r e e s enables the extensión serviceIRIConstraints to 
clearly define the services accessible by the delegatee with 
the delegation token containing the extensión. 
With a view to further clarifying the use of this exten-
sión, what follows is an example of the valúes that would 
be used in the fields of a Service Provider with a hier-
archical service structure like that shown in Fig. 10. The 
example corresponds to case c in Sect. 4.3.2 in which del-
egation is applied to a series of dispersed services out 
of the total offered by the provider. For example, those 
identified by the IRIs http://eadministration.org/VAT and 
all those under that identified by http://eadministration. 
org/IncomeTax, except employment, which is identified by 
the IRI http://eadministration.org/IncomeTax/Employment 
in Fig. 10. This case presents as a special feature that allows 
for two different subsets within the service logical structure 
and, second, it exeludes a specific service from one of the 
permitted subsets. This means that the prohibition must be 
explicitly reflected in e x c l u d e d S u b t r e e s in the list of 
excluded IRIs. 
case-c serviceIRIConstraints ::= { 
permittedSubtrees permitted-c, 
excludedSubtrees excluded-c 
} 
permitted-c ServiceSubtrees ::= { 
ServiceSubtree permitted-cl, permitted-c2 
} 
excluded-c ServiceSubtrees ::= { 
ServiceSubtree excluded-cl 
} 
permitted-cl ServiceSubtree ::={ 
base http://eadministration.org/VAT, 
minimum 0, 
máximum 0 
} 
permitted-c2 ServiceSubtree ::={ 
base http://eadministration.org/IncomeTax/, 
minimum 0 
} 
excluded-cl ServiceSubtree ::={ 
base http://eadministration.org/IncomeTax/ 
Employment, 
minimum 0, 
máximum 0 
} 
4.3.3 Fulfillment of requirements of the final delegation 
token 
The preceding sections presented different ideas and possi-
bilities for fulfllling the requirements in Sect. 2.2. The result 
is that the correct combination of all these pieces of infor-
mation gives rise to a proposed delegation token offered as a 
solution and graphically depicted in Fig. 12. 
Thebasis of the delegation token is aX.509 certifícate with 
the extensión PCI: that is, a proxy certifícate in which the fleld 
p o l i c y L a n g u a g e takes the valué i d - p p l - i n d e p e n -
d e n t (Independent), according to which the delegator grants 
none of its privileges to the delegatee. Henee, the delegatee 
receives from the delegator through an assertion only those 
privileges deriving from a set of SAML attributes contained 
in the token. Another important fleld in the proxy certifícate 
to which a default valué must be assigned is pCPathLen-
C o n s t r a i n t . For the delegation token proposed herein, it 
must have the valué zero by default: that is, by default, only 
direct delegation is allowed; thus, the delegatee cannot use 
the delegation token to delégate to a third party. The reason 
for this constraint is that the environment of Public Adminis-
trations, for which this solution is conceived, normally allows 
only one delegation leap. In addition, the more limited the 
delegation—here, the number of delegators and delegatees 
involved—it is more controllable from the perspective of 
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Fig. 12 Graphic depiction of the proposed delegation token 
security and auditing, where the latter is highly important in 
preventing possible misuse of delegation. Nonetheless, the 
fact that only direct delegation is allowed by default does not 
mean that—in certain environments and under certain condi-
tions—that indirect delegation, with a larger number of leaps 
in the delegation, is permitted. Besides extensión PCI, oblig-
atory in the Proxy Certificates, proposed delegation token 
includes other two extensions. The flrst one is deflned by 
Globus for the inclusión of SAML assertions but modifled 
by authors for use SAML v2 instead of vl . l . The second 
one called serviceIRIConstraints is suggested in this work 
to determine what services can be used with the delegation 
token. 
It is worth emphasizing that all the information necessary 
for access control and delegation is included in the token that 
is controlled by the delegator who decides what of fheir iden-
tity attributes delegates and what services of Service Provider 
grants delegated access, not leaving any aspect of the dele-
gation at the merey of the delegatee. The delegator decides 
what attributes to include in the token and, on the basis of 
these attributes, certain services are provided or not provided 
in the Service Provider. Further, the delegator also specifles 
which services available in a Service Provider are accessible 
with the token generated. 
It is also important to emphasize that, even though they are 
closely linked, delegation of identity and control of access to 
a service are two different things. The process of delegation 
involves issuance of a valid delegation token, without which 
the delegatee cannot access services. For its part, control of 
access to a service in a delegation environment involves the 
existence of a valid delegation token but, in turn, a valid del-
egation token that has been correctly formed does not imply 
immediate access to services by the delegatee. In addition to a 
delegation token that is valid, a series of access requirements 
must be fulfllled that may not be satisfled by the attributes 
and restrictions established by the delegator in the delegation 
token. 
If we analyze the proposed delegation token in terms of 
fulfillment of the six requirements specifled in Sect. 2.2, we 
will see that it satisfles all of them. Generation of a proxy 
certifícate is quick and easy and, initially, it can be trans-
parent to the user. Token integrity is fulfllled by the digital 
signature that must be included in the proxy certifícate. The 
signature also fulfllls the need to identify the issuer of the 
proxy certifícate, that is, the delegator. The requirement of 
identifying the user, that is, the delegatee, is simple if we 
recall that a proxy certifícate certifles a publie key for which 
the user must possess the prívate key. A simple challenge 
and response mechanism allows for verifying whether the 
delegation token has been issued for the user actually using 
it. The requirements of retrieval of the identity and service 
identifleation attributes for which delegation is enabled are 
satisfled, as we have seen, by extensions. 
4.4 Revoking a delegation token 
This section presents a solution to the particularly important 
problem of revoking delegation tokens. 
The validity period of the delegation token is set during the 
process of its issuance and is reflected in the token. Because 
the token is based on a proxy certifícate, flelds related to the 
validity period of the certifícate are used to set the valid-
ity period of the token, namely V a l i d i t y (No t Be f o r e 
and Not Af t e r ) . By default, and as a rule in the delega-
tion process, the validity period should match the estimated 
time of use of the token as closely as possible by seeking 
to reduce as much as possible the period in which the token 
can be compromised and thus minimize possible security 
problems arising from improper or unauthorized use of the 
token. Nonetheless, even if the validity period of the identity 
delegation token is reduced to the minimum essential level, 
the possibility that the token may be compromised must be 
addressed. A proxy certifícate is, in general, less secure than 
a X.509 certifícate. The main reason lies in the fact that the 
private key associated with a proxy certifícate is not pro-
tected with the same diligence and rigor as a private key 
associated to a X.509 certifícate. Henee, and given that the 
proposed delegation token is based on the use of a proxy 
certifícate, a revocation mechanism must be enabled. That 
is, there must be a mechanism to enable either revocation 
of a delegation and a publie statement of its invalidity or to 
check whether a delegation token has been declared invalid 
or not. 
The problem of revocation, which has clearly been solved 
in X.509 certificates with the mechanisms of CRLs [20] or 
the OCSP protocol [21], does not have a standard solution in 
the case of proxy certificates, as the RFC 3820 itself [17] has 
indicated that no mechanism has been deflned, as of yet, for 
revoking such certificates. Given that the delegation token 
proposed in this paper is basically a proxy certifícate, there 
is no directly applicable revocation mechanism. We will now 
present a solution to this problem: namely, a mechanism for 
revoking the proposed delegation token. 
A series of problems arise in establishing a mechanism for 
revoking proxy certificates. Unlike X.509 certificates, proxy 
certificates are not issued by a limited number of certifleation 
authorities; the entities that issue proxy certificates need not 
be online and, a priori, proxy certificates issued by an entity 
are unique from the point of view of identifleation wifhin the 
entity, but fhey need not be outside it. 
The fact that the uniqueness in identifying proxy certif-
icates is relative and that, theoretically, there are as many 
certifleation authorities (CAs) as end entities that wish to 
delégate—in proxy certificates, the end entity signing the 
proxy certifícate issued acts as the CA—means that the use 
of mechanisms based on a limited number of hierarchical 
CAs like CRLs or OCSPs, is unfeasible, as such mecha-
nisms are not designed for environments in which the num-
ber of CAs may be massive and where, in theory, fhey need 
not be online to provide revocation lists. The same conclu-
sions apply to the OCSP protocol, which is also designed 
for a limited number of hierarchical CAs. Henee, the prob-
lem of revoking proxy certificates and, thus, the proposed 
delegation tokens, arise from two issues: the lack of univ-
ocal identifleation and the lack of a centralized and perma-
nently online entity that might enable requests to revoke a 
token and provide answers to possible queries on revocation 
status. 
We will now present proposed solutions to these problems. 
4.4.1 Univocal delegation token identifleation 
A solution for revocation of delegation tokens requires, as a 
first step, univocal identifleation of tokens. In identifleation 
of a proxy certifícate—and thus a delegation token—there 
are a number of flelds whose valúes are set in RFC 3820, as 
follows: 
- Issuer. A proxy certifícate can be generated through use 
of either an X.509 certifícate or another proxy certifícate. 
The i s s u e r fleld in the proxy certifícate must contain 
the same valué as the sub j e c t fleld of the certifícate 
used to genérate it. 
- Issuer alternative ñame: Use of the extensión i s s u e r -
Al tName in the proxy certifícate is prohibited. 
- Serial number. As the serial number of a proxy certif-
ícate must be unique among all the proxy certificates 
issued by the same issuer, the issuancepolicy must ensure 
a minimal likelihood of colusión. Possible assignment 
policies involve consecutive whole numbers or serial 
numbers generated from the publie key hash of the proxy 
certifícate. 
- Subject: Shown in the sub j e c t fleld of the proxy cer-
tifícate. It is formed by adding to the sub j e c t fleld of 
the certifícate used to issue proxy certifícate a Common 
Ñame component. The valué of Common Ñame must 
be unique for every bearer of a proxy certifícate from 
the same proxy certifícate issuer. If an issuer issues two 
proxy certificates to the same bearer, it can choose to 
use the same Common Ñame for both. As in the previ-
ous case, the issuer of the proxy certifícate can choose a 
system that will ensure a high probability of uniqueness, 
with use of the same valué as for the serial number field. 
The result of this approach is that all subject ñames of 
proxy certificates derive from the ñame of the end entity 
certifícate that issued it and which are unique for every 
bearer. 
- Subject alternative ñame: Use of the extensión s u b -
j e c t A l tName on the proxy certifícate is prohibited. 
As we can see, there is not fleld which must necessarily be 
unique at a global level. The aim is to guarantee uniqueness 
within a given issuer of proxy certificates, while providing 
recommendations to achieve a certain degree of uniqueness, 
fhough wifhout establishing a single criterion as a standard 
for preventing collisions at a global level. Of the fields dis-
cussed above, sub j e c t on proxy certificates comes closest 
to achieving an identification system of the kind desired. If the 
valué of Common Ñame is chosen correctly, we can achieve 
an identification system that is unique and which associates 
the proxy certifícate to its issuer. One simple way of yield-
ing a Common Ñame with a high degree of uniqueness is 
proposed in the standard itself, which involves matching the 
valué with the result of applying an SHA hash algorithm to 
the proxy certificate's public key. 
This paper proposes as solution the following steps for 
issuing a delegation token: the sub j e c t field of the proxy 
certifícate, which acts as base, must be formed by adding the 
subj e c t of the X.509 certifícate of the entity issuing the 
delegation token; that is, the delegator, and a unique element 
resulting from the application of the SHA-256 hash function 
[31] to the public key of the delegation token. This solution 
not only verifies the criteria set forth in RFC 3820 but also 
achieves a high degree of uniqueness in the identification of 
delegation tokens, as the probability of a colusión in identifi-
ers issued in this way is quite small if we assume that different 
proxy certificates in a single generator have different public 
keys, which is a fair assumption. 
4.4.2 Delegation token revocation authority 
Having solved the problem of univocal identification of del-
egation tokens, we must address the lack of a centralized, 
permanently online entity that could handle revocations and 
responses to queries about the revocation status of tokens. 
We propose a solution consisting of the creation of an entity 
called the Delegation Token Revocation Authority (DTRA), 
which will manage, in a centralized manner, a register of 
delegation tokens that have been revoked. The fundamental 
principie is the same as that of CAs with fheir revocation lists, 
but adapted to theparticular conditions of identity delegation, 
namely: 
- No single, unique CA: As the number of CAs is, theoreti-
cally, unlimited, a revocation system based on a query of 
the CA issuing the certificate does not apply. Henee, the 
Delegation Token Revocation Authority will be a cen-
tralized entity managing a register of delegation tokens 
that have been revoked for its application environment. 
- Certificate identification: In PKIs, certificates are iden-
tified univocally by fheir serial number and CA. Thus, 
when revocation queries are made in relation to a CA, 
only the serial number of the certificate is required to 
check its status. When identifying delegation tokens, the 
Revocation Authority must use the identification solu-
tion discussed in the preceding section to ensure that each 
delegation token is identified in a univocal manner. This 
means that the format of the lists of revoked delegation 
tokens differs slightly from that of revoked X.509 certif-
icates, as identification by the s e r i a l associated to a 
CA must be replaced by the sub j e c t in the delegation 
token. 
When checking the revocation status of a delegation token, a 
query with the Delegation Token Revocation Authority will 
suffice. As with revocation lists of identity certificates or 
CRLs [20], the Delegation Token Revocation Authority will 
have revocation lists of delegation tokens, thus providing 
the list to an entity in the event of a query. The list identifies 
the delegation tokens that have been revoked by means of the 
subj e c t of each of these. Once the list has been received, 
the requesting entity will process it and check the revocation 
status of the token. 
Although we have chosen to use lists to check the revoca-
tion status of delegation, we might easily have decided to use 
a query protocol similar to OCSP [32]. Here, the Delegation 
Token Revocation Authority would respond in an individu-
alized manner to queries on the revocation status of a specific 
token identified univocally by its sub j e c t field. 
Both solutions are valid, although each has its own advan-
tages and drawbacks. Using lists offers the advantage of 
being able to make queries on revocation status even when 
the Delegation Revocation Authority is not available, as the 
entity may have a prior list. It also poses a problem of pri-
vacy concerning the information contained in the list aris-
ing from updating of the list of revoked tokens. Generally, 
entities will download revocation lists periodically, so they 
will not be aware of revocations that have taken place in the 
interim between updates. Using the OCSP protocol involves 
the opposite advantages and drawbacks: namely, it suffers 
from the drawback that if the Delegation Token Revocation 
Authority is not available, no query can be made of the revo-
cation status of a token, with the advantage that any reply to 
a revocation query will reflect the latest status of the token 
in question, as no update intervals exist. 
Bearing in mind the foregoing, the process of revoking a 
delegation consists of a notification by the delegator of the 
DTRA of the subject field of the token to be revoked and ver-
ification by the DTRA that the token has been generated by 
the delegator requesting revocation. In response to a service 
request, the Service Provider may use the DTRA to verify 
whefher the delegation token has been revoked or not. This 
revocation solution is valid for delegation tokens generated 
by the delegator, as presented in Sect. 4.5. Proxy certificates 
giving rise to a delegation token generated by an entity other 
than the delegator will require a sepárate revocation process, 
and the revocation process discussed herein would apply only 
to the delegation token, not the proxy certifícate on which it 
is based. This problem of revoking proxy certificates is not 
addressed in this paper, as it is assumed that all tokens are of 
the flrst type. 
Because delegation tokens are based on proxy certificates 
and that the delegation solution as a whole relies on the use 
of PKIs, we propose integrating the Delegation Token Rev-
ocation Authority as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) in the PKI 
scheme in which the delegation solution is being applied. 
DTRA is a TTP that, as explained in previous paragraphs, 
cannot revoke a delegation token without the delegator. The 
inclusión of the DTRA as TTP in the PKI reduces operational 
risks, as it is assumed that DTRA is forced by law to imple-
ment stringent audit measures in order to guarantee proper 
operation (identiflcation and authentication of authorized 
users, access controls, audit, inspections conducted to pro-
vide confldence that appropriate controls are in place, etc.). 
Since the proposed solution applied to an e-government envi-
ronment, we can also assume that, in many cases, DTRA will 
be managed by government. 
4.5 Identity delegation interactions 
The delegation process presented in this section is based 
on the delegation token discussed in the preceding section, 
while also using as its starting point the generic identity man-
agement scenario presented earlier which reflects the reality 
of most identity management and service provisión systems 
being used at present in Public Administrations in Europe. 
Initially, the participating entities are as we have discussed, 
namely: the delegator, delegatee, Service Provider, and the 
Identity Provider. 
The communication model and the interactions in the pro-
visión of a service with delegation would be as depicted in 
the figures below. The sequence in which the information is 
exchanged is as follows: The steps shown in Fig. 13 represent 
the interaction of a citizen or entity acting as a delegator 
with the Identity Provider: that is, the phase of authentica-
tion of the delegator. The details are as follows: 
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Fig. 13 Model of service provisión with delegation: authentication 
1. First, the delegator presents credentials in order to be 
authenticated. As in most countries of the European 
Union, there are different types of authentication: from 
simple ones like a user login with a password to the 
most complex and secure X.509 certificates. Given that 
the mechanism of authentication with X.509 certificates 
reflects the present trend in Europe as a whole, it will 
be adopted herein from this point onward. In addition to 
the authentication process, the delegator requests from 
the Identity Provider an attribute statement that includes 
attributes necessary for accessing the service(s) to be 
delegated. That is, the Identity Provider is asked for an 
SAML v2 assertion that contains user attributes related 
to the delegator as required by the Service Provider in 
allowing access to the service(s). For example, if the 
delegator wishes to delégate access to the service of 
applying for unemployment beneflts, the Identity Pro-
vider can deliver an SAML assertion indicating that the 
delegator is of legal age and unemployed. 
2. After checking the credentials of the delegator and 
verifying that everything is in order, the Identity Pro-
vider returns a signed SAML assertion that includes the 
requested attributes. The delegator has the task of check-
ing the integrity of the reply, the validity of the Identity 
Provider's signature and the accuracy of the set of attri-
butes about its identity contained in the SAML assertion. 
Following authentication and acquisition of the attributes 
statement in the form of an SAML assertion necessary for 
access to the service(s) of the Service Provider, the process 
of delegation takes place, in which the delegator issues a 
delegation token in accordance with the conditions set forth 
above and delivers it to the delegatee. In short, the delegator 
will build, on its own, a delegation token that will include, 
through a set of non-critical extensions, the SAML v2 asser-
tion with the attribute statement of the delegator issued and 
signed by the Identity Provider and the indication of the set of 
services offered by the Service Provider which the delegatee 
may access. It will now be shown as step three in graphics. 
This process may appear complex, but the degree of com-
plexity is lessened; if we recall that the majority of European 
public administrations and many administrations outside 
Europe, citizens have smart cards with encryption capaci-
ties that are now used in secure telematic transactions with 
administrations in which they can genérate keys or digital 
signatures. 
Now in possession of the delegation token, the delegatee 
may access services provided by the Service Provider, but in 
accordance with the limitations established by the delegator 
in the delegation token. 
Figure 14 depicts access to the service by the delegatee 
and delivery of results to the delegator. 
3. The delegator issues the identity delegation token and 
sends it to the delegatee through a secure channel. 
4. Now in possession of the delegation token, the delega-
tee has an element that allows it to request the service 
from the Service Provider in the ñame of the delegator. 
The Service Provider checks the validity of the delega-
tion token and the validation path. As we have seen, the 
delegation token is linked to the delegator by the signa-
ture, so the Service Provider knows on whose behalf the 
delegatee is accessing the service. Henee, on the basis 
of this link, as well as the SAML assertion with the 
attribute statement and the access constraints specifled in 
the delegation token through the extensión s e r v i c e -
I R I C o n s t r a i n t s , the Service Provider can make 
authentication and authorization decisions pertinent to 
allowing or denying access to the service as requested by 
the delegatee. 
5. Assuming that everything is in order, the Service Pro-
vider delivers information on the service requested to the 
delegatee. 
6. Once the interaction with the Service Provider is over, 
the delegatee sends the delegator the results of the ser-
vice requested. 
As is clear, step 2 (Fig. 13) consists of verifying the signa-
ture. This involves interaction between the delegator with the 
PKI to check if the Identity Provider's certifícate has been 
revoked or not. Further, the Service Provider must verify the 
delegator's signature in step 4, thus requiring it also to inter-
act with the PKI. This type of validation between citizens or 
entities and the PKI are now common in telematic access to 
services provided by publie administrations, and thus pose 
no special difflculties. This same step 4 also contains another 
validation process that must be prior to the signature valida-
tion process: the process of validating the delegation token. 
The delegation token validation process consists mainly of 
verifying two items: that the token delegation path is correct 
and that the token has not been revoked. 
Given that the delegation token is based on proxy cer-
tificates, its delegation path validation process is similar to 
that of the latter. Validating the delegation token requires the 
distinguished ñame and the publie key of the X.509 certifí-
cate of the delegator. If we use the more complex delegation 
model: that is, if we take into account the possibility of indi-
rect delegation, where the delegation path may be comprised 
of n delegation tokens, we must verify that the delegation 
path—that is, the chain of n delegation tokens—meets the 
following conditions: 
a For any xin the setbetween 1 andn-1 , thevalueof s u b -
j e c t in the delegation token x matches the valué of the 
issuer fleld of the delegation token x + 1 and the subject 
distinguished ñame of the delegation token x + 1 is a legal 
subject distinguished ñame to have been issued by the del-
egation token x. 
b Delegation token 1 is a valid delegation token issued by 
the end entity certifícate (EEC) of the delegator. This cer-
tifícate is provided as an input to the process of validating 
the delegation path. 
c Delegation token n is the delegation token to be validated. 
d For any x in the range between 1 and n, the delegation 
token x is valid at the time in question. 
e For all delegation tokens in the path with a certain valué 
i n p C P a t h L e n C o n s t r a i n t , thenumber of succeeding 
delegation tokens in the delegation path does not exceed 
the length specifled in said fleld. 
Of special interest in validating the delegation path is section 
d, which says that the delegation token must be valid at the 
time in question. This involves a recurring process in which 
each of the delegation tokens involved in the delegation path 
must verify that the delegation path leading up to it is correct 
and, further, that the delegation token has not been revoked. 
In our scenario, the entity that must verify bofh the delega-
tion token and the revocation status of delegation tokens is 
the Service Provider. Henee, a breakdown of step 4 shows 
what might be considered an interaction between the Service 
Provider and the Delegation Token Revocation Authority. 
Depicted in Fig. 15, it includes the Delegation Token Revo-
cation Authority and shows steps 4a and 4b of the process of 
querying the revocation status of the delegation token on the 
part of the Service Provider. Integrating the three preceding 
figures yields our definitive proposed model of service pro-
visión with delegation, as shown in Fig. 16. 
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Fig. 14 Model of service provisión with delegation: the delegator 
receives the service through the delegatee 
Fig. 15 Model of service provisión with delegation: process of query-
ing revocation status of delegation token 
Delegator Delegatee 
Fig. 16 Model of service provisión with delegation and revocation 
query 
5 Technical feasibility 
With a view to demonstrating the technical feasibility of the 
delegation token proposed, it has been implemented in a lim-
ited and simplifled scenario that reflects, on a small scale, a 
real application scenario. 
Four entities are involved in the small scenario used for the 
tests—delegator, delegatee, Service Provider and the Iden-
tity Provider—and these engage in the interactions discussed 
in the section providing details on the solution and shown in 
Fig. 16. 
All development was done in Java™ [33] by means of 
the JDK 6 Update 18 [34] and the Netbeans 6.8 integrated 
development environment [35]. Both the Identity Provider 
and the Service Provider are constituted by means of web ser-
vices implemented in Java and accessible through an Apache-
Tomcat 6.0.26 server [36]. 
To enable issuance of delegation tokens and signatures, 
and to verify signatures and include extensions, the func-
tionalities provided by Java JDK through APIs and toolkits 
had to be extended. Specifically, Java's cryptography support 
was enhanced with a cryptography API provided by Bouncy-
castle [37]. SAML assertions and their integration in proxy 
certificates which are the basis of the delegation tokens were 
handled with a part of the Globus Toolkit ® [38] combined 
with the GridShib plugin [39]. 
5.1 Applicability in a real environment 
To demónstrate its applicability, we shall now present the 
particular features of a model for possible provisión of ser-
vices by the Spanish Public Administration. Specifically, our 
example consists of a hypothetical Spanish citizen who is 
obliged to undertake administrative processes with the State 
Tax Revenue Agency telematically and decides to entrust the 
task to an agent, and henee must delégate part of his iden-
tity. The agent, in the role of delegatee, will undertake the 
steps that the citizen, in the role of delegator, has entrusted 
through use of the identity attributes necessary to access the 
service. 
As the communication model would be similar to that of 
the generic model, the most important task in specifying the 
model for a real environment is to clearly define which real 
entities correspond to which entities in the model. In our 
scenario: 
- Delegator. A citizen who seeks to carry out bureaucratic 
procedures with the state tax revenue agency but who 
decides to delégate. 
- Delegatee: The agent to whom the citizen delegates part 
of his identity. 
- Identity provider: The entity responsible for managing 
citizens' attributes information, authenticating citizens 
by means of their digital identity and for generating 
signed attribute statements through SAML 2.0 asser-
tions. In Spain, this task is performed by a platform 
supported by the national pólice forcé that validates 
digital identities in the electronic national identity card. 
This platform does not yet have the capacity to genér-
ate SAML assertions with identity attributes, but one 
assumes that it would acquire the capability for such 
operations if a model such as the one discussed herein is 
adopted. 
- Service provider: In our scenario, this would be the State 
Tax Revenue Agency (Agencia Estatal de Administrac-
ión Tributaria). 
- Delegation Token Revocation Authority: Given that this 
entity is one of the contributions made by this paper, no 
entity yet performs the tasks proposed for this authority. 
As we have noted, it is expected to be integrated in the 
national PKI as a trusted third party (TTP). 
- PKI: In Spain, the PKI is closely linked to citizens' digi-
tal identities, as these entities are based on X.509 certifi-
cates. Nationally, fhere are two authorities—the Ministry 
of Public Administrations and the Royal Spanish Mint. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will use the Ministry of 
Public Administrations in this example. 
Figure 17 depiets this scenario and the interactions between 
them, the details of which are as follows: 
1. The citizen (delegator) is authenticated by means of his 
electronic ID card and uses his X.509 certifícate with the 
authentication platform of the national pólice forcé. Fur-
ther, this process also requests from the platform deliv-
ery of an attribute statement using an SAML v2 asser-
tion to include all the user attributes required by the State 
Tax Revenue Agency to allow access to the service to 
be delegated. 
2. Once the national police's forcé authentication platform 
verifies who the citizen claims to be through the X.509 
certifícate, it returns a signed SAML attribute statement 
with the attributes requested. The citizen verifies the 
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Fig. 17 Real scenario of application of identity delegation solution and interactions between entities 
integrity of the reply, the validity of the signature and 
checks the accuracy of the identity attributes asserted 
in the SAML v2 attribute statement delivered by the 
authentication platform. 
The citizen contacts a trusted agent and requests that he 
initiate the identity delegation process in order to access 
to a service provided by the state tax revenue agency. 
In order to obtain a delegation token that will authorize 
him to act as a delegatee before the State Tax Revenue 
Agency, the agent issues an asymmetrical key pair—a 
public key and a private key—and sends the citizen the 
public key through a secure channel like SSL.4 
The citizen forms a delegation token with the public key 
received from the agent, the attribute statement signed 
by the authentication platform of the national pólice 
forcé and the indication in the IRI of the service offered 
by the State Tax Revenue Agency needed to perform the 
steps commissioned to the delegatee. This involves gen-
eration of a proxy certifícate for the public key received 
and the addition of extensions and the IRIs of the ser-
vices, yielding the delegation token as explained in 4.3.3 
and 4.5. 
When the delegation token is issued, the citizen sends it 
to the agent through a secure channel. 
The agent now has a delegation token that allows him 
to request provisión of the service from the State Tax 
Revenue Agency on behalf of the citizen. 
The State Tax Revenue Agency will validate the delega-
tion token and verify that the delegation path is correct 
4
 TTiis secure channel can be implemented with smart cards and by 
establishing SSL communication between the delegator and the dele-
gatee with use of their respective certificates. 
and that the token has not been revoked. It will also 
check the ñame of the citizen on whose behalf the agent 
is seeking to accede and whether the token has been gen-
erated for that delegatee (it can check this because only 
the delegatee has the private key paired with the public 
key included in the delegation token). 
9. Therefore, on the basis of the SAML assertion with the 
attribute statement and the IRI of the service specifled 
in the delegation token, the State Tax Revenue Agency 
will decide if it can provide the service requested by the 
agent acting in the ñame of the citizen. Assuming that 
everything is in order, the State Tax Revenue Agency 
will deliver to the agent the results of the provisión of 
the service requested. 
10. Once the interaction with the State Tax Revenue Agency 
has concluded, the agent will provide the citizen with the 
results of the service requested. 
It is clear that this delegation solution can be perfectly inte-
grated in a real scenario. If we use Spain as our scenario, the 
modiflcations to be made can be summarized as follows: 
- Add a trusted third party, the proxy certifícate revocation 
authority, to the present PKI infrastructure. 
- Centralize user attributes necessary for accessing ser-
vices in a single entity that acts as the Identity Provider, 
and enable it to support the issuance of SAML attribute 
statements. As the present electronic ID platform acts as 
the Identity Provider in Spain, it would be sufflcient to 
enact these changes in said platform. 
- Modify Service Providers with a view to basing access 
control on attributes and accepting delegation tokens. As 
most Service Providers in the present Public Adminis-
tration base user authentication and service provisión on 
X.509 certificates, modifying their behavior to enable 
them to understand delegation tokens should be a simple 
task. Ultimately, it is sufflcient to know how to process 
a definite set of X.509 v3 certifícate extensions. 
- Provide users with the tools they need to use their elec-
tronic ID cards to issue delegation tokens and complete 
the related steps (revocation, etc.). 
6 Conclusions and future research 
This paper provides a solution to a problem that is both 
ongoing and subject to public demand: delegation of iden-
tity in accessing telematic services generally and, in particu-
lar, those provided by Public Administrations. The solution 
herein lends a telematic form to processes of representation 
traditionally found in interactions between citizens and enti-
ties or Public Administrations and enshrined in the law of 
many member states of fheEuropean Union. It also facilitates 
pan-European implementation and expansión of the poten-
tial offered by Public Administrations to undertake telematic 
procedures. 
This solution is notably simple to implement and can eas-
ily be integrated in present-day identity management Sys-
tems in most member states of the European Union; henee, 
in principie, it can be quickly adopted and implemented in 
present scenarios of provisión of telematic services by Public 
Administrations. 
Thus, the solution is remarkably robust, as well as flex-
ible and easy to use from the point of view of both users 
and Public Administrations; the legitimacy of the origin and 
the integrity of the delegation token can be checked at any 
time. It enables mechanisms for canceling the validity of a 
delegation token that has been delivered. For such a cancel-
ation to take effect, mechanisms exist to query the status of 
delegation tokens. In the solution proposed, flexibility and 
dynamism have been enhanced. For instance, users need not 
engage in any processes of pre-registration or notifleation of 
administrative authorities when delegating. In like manner, 
delegation is effected immediately, with no complex steps or 
participation from a large number of entities, unlike the few 
scenarios in which delegation for telematic processes is now 
permitted. 
One significant and novel aspect of this solution lies in 
its provisión of mechanisms for achieving a high degree of 
granularity. Users can establish speciflc restrictions on the 
processes delegated and Service Providers can control and 
limit the use of delegation by a representative. 
The solution opens up new possibilities and flelds of study 
that should be considered for future research. This paper 
proposes the existence in each application environment of 
an entity called the Delegation Token Revocation Authority 
that would be responsible for maintaining the revocation sta-
tus of a delegation token. Further research should determine 
whether more than one such entity should exist in a scenario 
and, if so, how their hierarchical organization might opti-
mize query and revocation processes, providing answers to 
questions such as: Which entity should notifled of a revoca-
tion? or, Which of them should reply to a query concerning 
a speciflc delegation token? 
Moreover, the solution to identity delegation is circum-
scribed to a speciflc, controlled environment, namely the 
Public Administration, where all digital identities are issued 
by the same provider and in the same format. In the future, 
research should address possible application of this solu-
tion in more heterogeneous environments like citizens' inter-
actions with private entities like banks or in environments 
dedicated to speciflc groups, like those related to eHealth 
scenarios. 
Another issue not addressed in this solution is anonymity 
in the delegation process. This solution enables dynamic del-
egation in which the Service Provider knows the identity of 
both the delegator and the delegatee. Future research would 
also envisage the possibility of a form of identity delega-
tion that is similar yet which supports anonymity, that is: a 
dynamic identity delegation process in which the delegator, 
the delegatee or both are anonymous to the Service Provider, 
while ensuring the guarantees required from a security per-
spective. This potential would open new doors to the use of 
delegation in flelds where anonymity is crucial, such as pro-
cesses of citizen participation or electronic voting. As some 
countries today allow for delegated voting, the possibility of 
integrating the identity delegation solution proposed herein 
in a telematic voting system in a way that maintains all the 
security assurances and restrictions inherent to such systems 
would pose a major challenge. 
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